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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Panel 15 – Analysis for Enhanced Acquisition 
Decision-Making 
Thursday, May 12, 2011 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m. 
Chair: J. David Patterson, Executive Director, National Defense Business 
Institute, The University of Tennessee 
The Effect of Processes and Incentives on Acquisition Cost Growth 
Doug Bodner, Bill Rouse, and I-Hsiang Lee, Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
The Failures and Promises of an Operational Service-Oriented 
Architecture: The ROI of Operational Effectiveness in Addition to 
Acquisition Efficiency at the Navy’s Op Level of War 
Richard Suttie, U.S. Naval War College, and Nicholas Potter 
The Theory and Feasibility of Implementing an Economic Input/Output 
Analysis of the Department of Defense to Support Acquisition Decision 
Analysis and Cost Estimation 
Eva Regnier and Dan Nussbaum, NPS 
David Patterson—Executive Director, National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee. 
Mr. Patterson is establishing an institution inspiring business innovation for both government and 
industry at the University of Tennessee in the College of Business Administration by providing 
practical, sound assistance in creating economically efficient and effective Defense business and 
acquisition programs. He is responsible for preparing funding proposals and budgets and for 
recruiting and managing university staff, professors, other faculty members, and key subject-matter 
experts engaged in relevant research and resource development tasks. 
Prior to his current duties, he was the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). As 
the Principal Deputy, he was directly responsible for advising and assisting the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) with development, execution, and oversight of the DoD budget, exceeding 
$515 billion, with annual supplemental requests of more than $160 billion. He was also responsible 
for developing legislative strategies and developing and implementing DoD financial policy, financial 
management systems, and business modernization programs. In June 2005 Mr. Patterson was 
appointed to lead the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, a comprehensive 
evaluation of every aspect of the Defense Department acquisition system and decision making 
processes. 
From August 2003 to June 2005, Mr. Patterson held duties as The Special Assistant to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. In the capacity as Special Assistant, Mr. Patterson was responsible for 
managing the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s personal staff as well as providing direction and advice 
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff on a wide range of national security operations and 
policy subjects. He contributed to the Department of Defense support to the United States’ mission to 
establish free and economically successful societies and governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Additionally, Mr. Patterson supported the Deputy Secretary in the areas of military commissions for 
detainees in the Global War on Terrorism and major defense acquisition programs. 
Before returning to government service, Mr. Patterson was a founding and managing partner at 
Bucher, Hutchins, Kohler and Patterson, Inc., where he led the firm’s commercial consulting practice, 
developing management strategies for acquiring new business. From 1999 to 2001, he was the Vice 
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President and Site Manager for Steven Myers and Associates’ support to Lockheed Martin 
Corporation’s winning Joint Strike Fighter competitive proposal preparation. 
Between 1993 and 1999, Mr. Patterson held a variety of responsible, executive positions at 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (later The Boeing Company), beginning as the Senior Manager for 
Market Research and Analysis on the C-17 military air cargo aircraft and later as Director, 
International Business Development. He was responsible for developing and executing the business 
capture strategy that won U.S. Government Defense Acquisition Board approval to procure 80 
additional C-17s, completing the first contract for 120 aircraft. Mr. Patterson led the Boeing business 
development team that launched the initiative to introduce a commercial version of the C-17; the BC-
17. 
Mr. Patterson served in the Air Force from 1970 to 1993, retiring in the rank of colonel. During that 
time, he held responsible leadership and management positions, with assignments at the air wing 
level as a C-5A aircraft commander and Deputy Operations Group Commander, at major command 
headquarters, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Inspector General. In 1986, Mr. Patterson was the Air Force 
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The Failures and Promises of an Operational Service-Oriented 
Architecture: The ROI of Operational Effectiveness in Addition 
to Acquisition Efficiency at the Navy’s Op Level of War 
Richard Suttie—Assistant Dean of Academics, Naval War College.  Professor Suttie oversees 
research and war gaming operations, and he researches the future of naval strategy for the Chief of 
Naval Operations.  Captain Suttie logged more than 3,500 hours in a variety of naval aircraft, 
primarily the P-3 Orion. He served on Battle Group staffs embarked on USS Midway and USS 
Missouri, and had aviation command in 1996. He was subsequently assigned to attaché duty at the 




This paper and presentation will share four years of research by the Naval War 
College into the operational requirements for a service-oriented architecture (SOA) 
for the Navy’s operational level of war applied at the Navy’s Maritime Operations 
Centers (MOCs). It will also argue that the cost-benefit analysis for SOA must be the 
improved operational effectiveness of the organization, not just the lower costs of 
data management and reduced redundancies of legacy systems. It will share a 
model for such an evaluation, and a model for proper protocols and data 
management for implementation. This paper argues that the proper cost-benefit 
analysis of service-oriented architecture is not possible without an operational 
integrated architecture that explicitly captures the role-based decision making 
protocols mapped to the core operational and enterprise-wide processes necessary 
to improve operational effectiveness. This paper and presentation will share this 
research and its direct application to the design and implementation of SOA for the 
Navy’s Operational Level of War. 
Report Summary 
This paper and presentation will share four years of research by the Naval War 
College into the operational requirements for a service-oriented architecture (SOA) for the 
Navy’s operational level of war applied at the Navy’s Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs). 
It will also argue that the cost-benefit analysis for SOA must be the improved operational 
effectiveness of the organization, not just the lower costs of data management and reduced 
redundancies of legacy systems. It will share a model for such an evaluation, and a model 
for proper protocols and data management for implementation. 
A primary goal of information technology (and related knowledge management 
acquisition) has been to optimize and obtain efficiencies related to coherence to legacy IT 
systems and protocols. Improving different IT characteristics such as speed and coherency 
are seen as the primary metrics of cost-benefit analysis and system’s effectiveness. Some 
offer that a requirement to improved efficiency would be to better understand the tasks 
within the work breakdown structure and the functionality of the systems themselves. 
However, this depends on the Enterprise Architecture satisfactory reflecting the 
requirements for data exchange from the operational requirement. It often does not, and 
does not in the critical domain of the operational level of war, where importantly a properly 
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designed SOA (such as Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services, CANES) 
would have a profound impact on operational performance of warfighting decision making. 
Research at the Naval War College has yielded a methodology which can establish 
an architecture that would be both accurate and dynamic, and well serve SOA design 
leading to a full benefit analysis. 
The paper and presentation will share CBCA (Capabilities Based Competency 
Assessment) research conducted over the last four years by the Naval War College. CBCA 
has produced a data model which identifies and defines the critical nodes for the operational 
architecture across the Navy’s Maritime Operations Centers MOCs, and places that work in 
a dynamic workforce environment which allows architects and IT designers to capture the 
necessary business (operations) context for correct rules and protocols for data 
management. 
This paper argues that the proper cost-benefit analysis of service-oriented 
architecture is not possible without an operational integrated architecture which explicitly 
captures the role-based decision making protocols mapped to the core operational and 
enterprise-wide processes necessary to improve operational effectiveness. 
Operational effectiveness is improved by synchronizing and enabling delivery of valid 
and reliable information (data + data context) with the right content (information + process 
context) to the right user (role + content). 
MOCs are operational planning nodes within the Navy’s numbered fleet commands. 
They are inherently joint, process driven, and globally connected. 
CBCA research has developed a methodology that delivers the visibility, sequencing 
and coherency (data convergence) necessary for the performance of roles within and across 
the MOCs. The research and outcomes argue that any return on investment or cost-benefit 
analysis must use operational effectiveness as the primary measure, and demonstrates one 
method to do so. 
This paper and presentation will share this research and its direct application to the 
design and implementation of SOA for the Navy’s Operational Level of War. 
